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Common everyday materials such as textiles, foodstuffs, soil or skin can have complex, mutable 
and varied appearances. Under typical viewing conditions, most observers can visually recognize 
materials effortlessly, and determine many of their properties without touching them. Visual 
material perception raises many fascinating questions for vision researchers, neuroscientists and 
philosophers, yet has received little attention compared to the perception of colour or shape.  Here 
we discuss some of the challenges that material perception raises and argue that further 
philosophical thought should be directed to how we see materials. 
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1. Introduction 
Philosophers have long been preoccupied with the puzzles that vision presents. Sometimes these 
puzzles reflect familiar aspects of what we see, such as color or shape. Some aspects – such as 
motion or depth – while not as puzzling, are certainly in the philosopher’s purview. Other aspects 
are not. We also see what material things are made of (e.g., wood, glass, or velvet) and from sight 
alone have a vivid sense of their material properties (e.g., rough, soft, glossy or fragile). In the last 
two decades the scientific study of how we visually perceive materials has rapidly expanded 
(Fleming, 2017). Yet, philosophy has paid scant attention to this growing field. The present paper 
aims to remedy this oversight. In Section 2, we further introduce the phenomenon of material 
perception. In Section 3, we review main themes in empirical research on the topic. In Section 4, 
we highlight the apparent absence of material perception in the history of philosophy, but not art. 
Finally, in Section 5, we make preliminary connections between materials and philosophical issues 
of perception. 
 
2. The phenomenon of material perception 
To begin, we hope to impress upon the reader a subjective appreciation for material perception as 
a salient and pervasive aspect of how we see the world. Broadly speaking, the phenomenon has 





Figure 1. A mundane still-life of synthetic materials (i.e., plastic or polyester). 
 
First, when we look at our surrounding world, we see not only objects, but also what things are 
made of. In other words, one essential component of perceiving materials is our capacity to 
recognize things in our environment as being constituted by materials of different types. In Figure 
1, we can readily pick out what types of objects are present in the scene: a sponge, watering can, 
to-go container, hand towel, and resealable bag. We also perceive what they are made of – all of 
the items depicted are composed of different synthetic materials (plastics or polyesters) even while 
sharing few obvious visual features in common, such as shape or color. Materials are not just the 
things from which objects are made however. Many parts of our surroundings cannot be described 
as objects with distinctive shapes and numbers (i.e. by applying count nouns), but are instead 
“stuff”, described by mass nouns: sand, yoghurt, water, soil, wallpaper (Adelson, 2001).  
 
The second essential component of perceiving materials is perception of their properties. In Figure 
1 we see that the container is transparent, the bag is glossy, the sponge and towel are matte, and 
the watering can is translucent. We also have a visual impression of many properties we normally 
associate with touch: the towel looks soft, the sponge rough, the lid of the container smooth, and 
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the bag slick. Furthermore, we can predict how these objects would interact with one another or 
our hands: the sponge would feel squishy, the can rigid, the container springy, the towel limp, and 
the bag crinkly.  
 
Since our first impression of our surroundings is usually by sight, this ability to see what things 
are made of, and what material properties they likely have, provides crucial information to help 
guide our actions. Because we are able to predict how things will feel when touched or behave 
when manipulated, we are better able to interact successfully without breaking, crushing, or 
slipping on them. Thus, seeing materials is both a salient and pervasive part of our visual 
experience, and an important practical ability. 
 
3. The empirical study of material perception 
It is only with the publication of Adelson’s (2001) seminal “On seeing stuff” that material 
perception has grown into an active and recognized branch of vision science.1 Research has tended 
to focus on the two aspects of the phenomenon highlighted earlier: (i) how do we visually 
recognize material categories? and (ii) how do we infer material properties from visual cues? After 
reviewing some of the research on these topics, we touch on some theoretical issues and open 
questions of this burgeoning field. 
 
3.1 Recognizing material categories 
Only very recently has human facility at material recognition been quantified. People can label 
close-up photographs of materials like fabric, paper, and plastic (Figure 2) by their correct material 
categories with an average accuracy of 85% (Sharan et al 2013). For comparison, the best available 
modern computer vision models reach only 64-69% accuracy (Wieschollek & Lensch 2016, Bell 
et al. 2015). Observers can even successfully recognize materials during ultra-rapid presentations 
of ~40 ms (Sharan et al. 2014; Wiebel et al. 2013), and when presented with samples identify 
materials far more accurately by sight (90% accuracy) than by touch (66%; Baumgartner, Wiebel 
 
1 The first attempts to objectively measure material properties arose from industrial scientists wishing to quantify, 
for example, the glossiness of paper stocks produced by different manufacturing processes (Ingersoll, 1921). These 
studies prompted attempts to catalogue the different aspects of the concept of “glossiness,” from the physical to the 




& Gegenfurtner, 2013). Performance also seems to improve throughout the lifespan, as children 
tend to perform worse on material categorization tasks than adults (Balas, 2017). 
 
A useful comparison can be made here with object recognition, which is a compelling visual 
phenomenon because it occurs rapidly and effortlessly across infinite variations in pose, 
illumination, distance, or self-occlusion (DiCarlo et al. 2012). Yet, although viewing conditions 
can vary widely, the properties of objects themselves, such as shape, only change in constrained 
ways. In contrast, materials can be formed, and transformed, by myriad physical processes, so that 
the same material can take on radically different appearances. Thus, examples of the same material 
category can appear very distinct, and examples of different material classes can share many 
similarities (Figure 2). Our ability to recognize materials suggests that we are able to use even 
more ephemeral and mutable visible features than required for object recognition (Adelson, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2. These photographs are grouped into columns based on material type: fabric (left), paper 
(middle) or plastic (right), yet images within a row appear more visually similar. Reproduced from 
the Flickr Material Database (Sharan, Rosenholtz & Adelson, 2014) under a Creative Commons 




Recognizing a familiar material brings with it expectations about the properties that material 
typically has (Figure 3). People reliably associate different material categories (e.g., stone, wood, 
glass) with different properties (e.g., hardness, roughness, transparency), and a material’s category 
can be predicted with 90% accuracy from such properties (Fleming et al. 2013). This impacts how 
we interact with an object or substance. For example, people decide how firmly and where to grasp 
an object depending on whether they expect it to be slippery, fragile or heavy (Johansson & 
Westling 1984; Paulun et al. 2014, 2016). Such prior expectations are exploited in the “material-
weight illusion” (Seashore, 1899) where objects of equal size, shape, and mass have been 
manipulated to appear to be of different materials (e.g. brick vs wood) and are reported as having 
different weights (Buckingham et al 2009; Paulun et al. 2019). 
 
 
Figure 3. By identifying the type of material, we form expectations about what properties it will 
have. These artworks play with our expectations by pitting the apparent properties of objects 
against those usually associated with their materials: (A) “sliced” stone; (B) “folded” stone; (C) 
“melted” porcelain; (D) “splashed” rug. All images reproduced with permission: (A) “Delicious 
Stone II” sculpture by Hirotoshi Ito, image © 2017 Paris Art Web; (B) “Sin Título” sculpture and 
image © 2016 José Manuel Castro López; (C) “Nomad Patterns” sculpture and image © 2012 




3.2. Seeing material properties 
Recognising familiar materials is not the only way to visually infer material properties. We also 
use visual information to more directly perceive such properties. Research on perceptible material 
properties has tended to focus on those that are either closely associated with surface reflectance 
(e.g., glossiness, transparency, and translucency) or dynamic interactions (e.g., elasticity, softness, 
and viscosity). We shall refer to these loosely as optical and mechanical properties, respectively. 
These properties are often independent. Gelatin and glass are both transparent, but one is soft and 
the other hard. However, mechanical properties can influence optical ones. A surface that is rough, 
for instance, is generally not glossy, because a physically uneven surface scatters light in many 
directions, producing a diffuse matte appearance. 
 
Optical properties of course depend on light striking a surface, where it can then be absorbed, 
reflected, or transmitted. When surfaces are opaque, their reflectance properties can be fully 
described by the bidirectional reflectance distribution function (BRDF) (Nicodemus, 1965). The 
BRDF describes the proportion of light that is reflected from a surface in each direction, relative 
to the light arriving at it from each direction. Similar to how surfaces absorbing different 
wavelengths of light tend to produce different colour experiences, surfaces with different BRDFs 
tend to produce experiences of different optical properties, appearing matte, glossy, or mirror-like 





Figure 4. Surface materials with different reflectance properties often create different perceptual 
impressions. Here the same 3D surface shape is rendered using computer graphics three times, 
simulating different reflectance properties. If incoming light reflects diffusely in all directions, a 
surface appears matte (Figure 4A); if it reflects multiple directions but partially follows the same 
angle of arrival, it often appears glossy (Figure 4B); and if the angles of arrival and reflection are 
identical, it appears mirror-like (Figure 4C).  
 
However, there is no direct mapping between the parameters of the BRDF and perception. Identical 
materials can look differently glossy when seen from a different angle, under different lighting, or 
applied to a surface with a different shape (Nishida & Shinya, 1998). In other words, observers do 
not show perfect gloss constancy, in the same way they do not show perfect colour constancy. 
Gloss constancy is generally better when a surface is seen in natural outdoor lighting than when 
lit more simply, such as by a single lamp (Fleming et al. 2003; Motoyoshi et al. 2011; Pont et al. 
2006), and when a surface is moving, and viewed with both eyes (Wendt et al., 2010). Our 
perception of glossiness also seems to depend on the sharpness, contrast, and complexity of 
highlights as materials that reflect light in a less scattered way tend to have highlights with these 
characteristics (Marlow et al. 2012; van Assen et al., 2016). However, highlights are also affected 
by illumination conditions and surface shape, leading to failures of gloss constancy (Ho, Landy & 
Maloney, 2008; Marlow, Kim & Anderson, 2012). In sum, perception of gloss depends on a 
complex (unknown) function of the reflectance properties, the illumination, the observer’s viewing 
angle, and the shape of the surface (for review see Chadwick & Kentridge, 2015). 
 
When it comes to mechanical properties, our perception depends primarily on motion and shape 
information. For example, more smoothly flowing motion patterns look more liquid-like (Kawabe 
et al., 2015), and the viscosity of a poured liquid can be judged from just a static snapshot by the 
shapes it forms (Figure 5B; Paulun et al., 2015).  Motion and shape cues often work in concert, 
arising from interactions between materials and the environment or external forces (Van Assen et 
al., 2018). For example, the way a piece of cloth folds is diagnostic of its stiffness (Bi and Xiao, 
2016; Bouman et al. 2013; Schmidt et a. 2017), and viewers can use observed deformations of 
objects to judge their softness (Kawabe & Nishida, 2016; Paulun et al., 2017), or their bounce 
behaviour to estimate elasticity (Nusseck et al., 2007; Paulun & Fleming, 2020; Warren et al., 
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1987). Dynamic clues to mechanical properties usually dominate perception if they are 
experimentally brought in conflict with prior expectations (Figure 5A; Paulun et al. 2017). 
Reliance on dynamic cues requires great flexibility though; the amount of spread or piling, while 
useful for discerning viscosity when a liquid is poured onto a flat plane is not useful as a cue when 
it is being stirred in a container. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mechanical properties can be inferred from the way materials behave when forces act 
upon them. (A) A metal-looking cube that appears soft once it is deformed by a rod (Paulun et al., 
2017). (B) Frames from videos of simulated liquids that appear to vary in viscosity based on their 
shape and motion cues (van Assen, Barla & Fleming, 2018). 
 
Our perception of both optical and mechanical properties showcases our prowess at disentangling 
the visual effects of multiple, complexly interacting physical causes. The presence of highlights 
depends not just on the reflectance properties of a surface, but also its shape and illumination. How 
much a material deforms when pressed depends not just on its softness but the amount of pressure 
that is exerted. What the above research makes clear is that attributing material properties to things 
in the visible world requires the visual system to solve a cascade of causal attribution problems. 
 
3.3 Issues in the explanation of material perception 
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The studies we have reviewed contain important insights about material perception yet leave many 
questions unanswered. Little is known about the developmental trajectory of material perception 
(Balas et al. 2020), its neural basis (for a review see Schmid and Doerschner, 2019), or how we 
predictively reason about materials (Bates et al. 2019). Indeed, the diverse – even heterogenous – 
nature of the phenomenon has frustrated the development of unifying theoretical approaches. This 
is reflected in the fact that we as yet do not have a good answer to the question: how are material 
recognition and property perception linked? 
 
 
Figure 6.  Schematic of some of the ways in which object recognition, material recognition, and 
material property estimation are interlinked, and arise from visual features, which are in turn 
caused by physical interactions between materials and their environment. 
 
Whatever the relationship, it is complex and dynamic. What visual cues we rely on when seeing 
materials may vary depending on the task, such as recognizing familiar materials, estimating 
properties of unfamiliar ones, planning to grasp an object, or predicting how it will respond to 
interaction with the environment (cf. Fleming, 2017). Furthermore, because the space of materials 
and their properties is so diverse, the visual dimensions used to identify one material type or 
property might be useless or inappropriate for another. In a recent study, Schmid et al. (2020) 
found that people judge how glossy an object is differently depending on what material category 
it appears to have. It may be useful to think of the relationship between recognition and property 
perception as going in both directions, in the sense that material category recognition can influence 
material property estimation, and vice versa (Figure 6; Fleming, 2017; Schmidt et al. 2017; van 
Assen et al., 2016). We can connect certain profiles of visual features to certain types of material 
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(in some cases via a connection between object types and material types; e.g., tables are typically 
made of wood). Having recognised the material, we understand through association what material 
properties it likely has, along with characteristics that otherwise are only accessible through other 
senses, or through wider world knowledge (e.g., having visually identified a liquid as ketchup, we 
can recall its taste, and the fact that it tends to come in bottles or sachets and is associated with fast 
food). Alternatively, we can connect certain profiles of static or dynamic visual features to certain 
optical or mechanical material properties (e.g., a “bouncing” pattern of motion creates an 
impression of an elastic material). Having estimated the material properties, we may in turn 
understand the material type. Each connection between these elements invites further exploration. 
 
Although much work remains to be done, discoveries about material perception have nonetheless 
raised important issues that speak to how vision is explained more generally. Here we will briefly 
touch on two of them. 
 
 
Figure 7. An illustration of textural representation. The two cut-out regions of grass look to have 
the same texture or be “made of the same stuff”. Yet, they don’t consist of any simple repetition of 
pattern elements and could not be spatially aligned with one another. Their perceptual similarity 
likely lies in their similar statistical properties, such as in terms of how the orientation, colour, 
brightness, and spatial frequency of line segments are distributed in the two images.  
 
The first concerns the nature of the visual system’s representation of the visible world. One way 
of thinking of what and how we see encourages us to think of the visible world as segmented into 
discrete objects of different shape against scene backgrounds. Such a perspective is reflected in 
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the Gestalt tradition, with its focus on principles of perceptual organization for figure-ground 
segmentation and grouping (Wagemans et al. 2012). However, materials emphasize a different 
perspective, according to which the visible world is represented in terms of continuous statistical 
texture, relating to different materials in a scene (Beck, 1983; Julesz, 1975). This alternative 
approach is popular in computer vision analyses that decompose an image into local and global 
statistical properties of orientation, contrast, and spatial frequency (Campbell and Robson, 1968; 
Nishida, 2019; Oliva and Tarralbo, 2001). In natural environments for example, large swathes of 
the visible scene often appear to be made of the same “stuff”— grass, foliage, river rocks—yet do 
not have any directly repeating spatial elements (Figure 7). When artificial images are computer-
synthesised to have the same high-level image statistics as regions of natural scenes, they are often 
indistinguishable from one another and even from natural images (Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011; 
Wallis et al., 2017). This suggests that the visual system relies on a textural representation of the 
summary statistics within image regions, rather than a precise spatial parsing (although effortful 
scrutiny can allow an observer to compare the spatial arrangement of elements in textures). An 
important question is the extent to which seeing materials and their properties relies on the visual 
system representing statistical properties of images. For example, Motoyoshi et al. (2007) 
suggested that perceived glossiness could be explained by a simple statistic summarising the 
distribution of bright and dark points on a surface (glossy surfaces tend to have just a few very 
bright points, where highlights lie). However, other studies found that surfaces with an identical 
distribution of brightness can have very different apparent gloss, depending on their apparent 3D 
shape (Figure 8; Marlow et al. 2012, 2015; Olkkonen and Brainard, 2010).2 Nevertheless, more 
complex statistics may play an important role in material perception. 
 
 
2 A separate issue is that the very same region of an image can appear as a material texture or scene. Thus, whether a 
region appears as a material in the first place cannot simply be a result of image statistics or textural representations 





Figure 8. The effect of 3D shape on gloss perception. The surface on the left is perceived as less 
glossy than the surface on the right, even though the contrast gradients are identical, due to the 
alignment between the gradients and the curvatures of the bounding contours, which determine 
the perceived 3D shape of the stimuli (from Marlow et al. 2015).  
 
The second issue is perhaps even more fundamental, and concerns whether the visual system 
“estimates” physical material properties at all. One can imagine a framework according to which 
the visual system carries out a procedure of “inverse optics” to approximate true physical 
characteristics (e.g., surface BRDF, mechanical elasticity) as closely as our finite brains will allow, 
and then recognises the type of material that best matches the profile of estimated properties. 
However, the complexities of material perception do not easily fit this picture. An alternative 
perspective is that we learn the ways in which visual appearance and behaviour varies across 
materials, leading to representations that both cluster materials by type, and form dimensions of 
material properties based on these types (Fleming, 2014). In other words, under this alternative, 
our perception of material properties, and their forms of variation, is in a sense by-product of 
material recognition. 
 
Both these issues are crucial for building models of material perception as illustrated by the use of 
deep neural networks (DNNs) in vision science. DNNs can be trained to label material categories 
without first estimating material properties (Bell et al. 2015; Wiesschollek and Lensch, 2016) and 
can learn complex regularities from images that are diagnostic of perceived gloss without receiving 
any information about physical surface reflectance (Fleming and Storrs, 2019; Storrs, Anderson, 
and Fleming, 2021). In this way, recent interests in the representational capacities of DNNs for 
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shapes and texture, which are of interest to philosophical discussions of learning and abstraction 
(Buckner, 2018), are also foundational to current attempts to explain how we see materials. 
 
4. Material perception and the history of thought 
While the empirical study of material perception has only recently taken off, it is striking that (to 
our knowledge) historically there is virtually no acknowledgment by (natural) philosophers of 
materials as a visual subject matter. Consider examples drawn from two important epochs in the 
philosophical discussion of perception.  
 
In the Ancient Period, material properties featured in theories of perception but not as a visual 
phenomenon being explained. Presocratics like Alcameon of Croton and Anaxagoras claimed 
seeing is manifested by the reflective properties of the eye as a “gleaming” surface. Theophrastus, 
in his de Sensibus, criticizes this theory on the grounds that many surfaces (such as water or bronze) 
are reflective, but do not perceive. Aristotle famously held that seeing involved an emanation of 
form, but not matter, from objects to the eyes and posited a transparent external medium while 
acknowledging, in de Anima, that some solid bodies are also transparent. In both cases our ability 
to see reflective and transparent materials is not recognized as a perceptual phenomenon also 
demanding explanation.3 
 
In the Early Modern Period, many philosophers followed Locke (including Boyle, Galileo, 
Hobbes, and Reid) in making extensionally similar distinctions between primary sensible qualities, 
which reflect the fundamental structure of reality, versus those that do not, and are therefore 
secondary, including color. Although the distinction was typically grounded in a mechanical or 
materialist philosophy, for which primary qualities included shape, size, or motion, again materials 
and their properties did not feature as examples of either type of quality.4 
 
 
3 An interesting case is Democritus’ lost work on colour, for which Theophrastus is a major source. Different 
material properties such as smoothness, fragility, and hardness feature in his analysis of brightness (Rudolph, 2020).  
 
4Though according to Reid we can learn to see anything we might also perceive by touch, including hardness. See 




These examples are by no means exhaustive and we welcome any attempt by philosophers of 
history to find evidence of material perception discussed in the philosophical canon. However, 
unlike philosophy, there can be no question of the centrality of material perception to the history 
of art, in which the aim has long been to depict not just objects, but materials, like the granite of 
the bowl in Figure 9A. Indeed, some of the most celebrated works in art history, such as van Eyck’s 
Arnolfini Portrait (1432) and Sanmartino’s Veiled Christ (1753), are remembered precisely 
because of the fidelity of their rendering of materials (Figure 9B - C). One cannot produce these 
works without (at least implicit) attention to some of the principles that govern material perception 







Figure 9. Artistic depictions of materials and their properties. (A) Die Grantischale in der 
Schleifmaschine (1931), by Johann Erdmann Hummel. (B) Detail from The Arnolfini Portrait 
(1434), by Jan van Eyck. (C) Detail from Cristo Velato (1753), by Giuseppe Sanmartino. (D) Detail 
of fresco from the Great Tomb at Lefkadia (3rd Century BCE). (E) Detail of the Charioteer of Delphi 
(5th Century BCE). (F) Detail of Still Life with Fruit and a Lobster by Jan Davidsz. De Heem (1640 
– 1700), used as a stimulus by Di Ciccoci et al. (2019). 
 
In the Republic, Plato makes passing reference to skiagraphia, or “shadow-painting”, which was 
an important artistic practice in antiquity and involved depicting surface highlights, as in Figure 
9D (Tanner, 2016),5 Also sculpting to imply mechanical properties was clearly already mastered 
(Figure 9E). Similarly, at roughly the same time that philosophers were distinguishing primary and 
secondary qualities, artists like Wilhelmus Beurs (1656 – 1700) were developing detailed manuals 
for convincingly painting the material properties of objects like grapes (their gloss, translucence, 
and bloom) in the interest of mastering stofuitdrukking, or the “rendering of texture” of materials 
(Figure 9F).  
 
Increasingly, artistic practice has itself become the source of insights for the science of material 
perception. For example, a series of studies have investigated the depiction of material properties 
like glossiness in still life and the fidelity of paintings that follow Beurs’ instruction (di Cicco et 
al. 2019, 2020), and Phillips and Fleming (2020) investigated the ability of subjects to distinguish 
apparent layers of different materials in stimuli inspired by sculptures like the Veiled Christ. This 
reflects a more general belief that the scientific study of material perception has something to gain 
from artmaking, both past and present (Schmidt, 2019).6 
 
5. Materials and puzzles of perception 
Material perception is an exciting and rapidly developing branch of vision science, as we have 
seen. In this section we illustrate how, on the one hand, careful attention to how we see materials 
 
5 Another related, but obscure notion, is that of poikilia, which was associated with many properties of artworks 
originally applied to textures and fabric (see Grand-Clement, 2015).  
 
6 The Presocratics also looked to art to inspire their theories of perception. Democritus wrote a (lost) treatise on 




has the potential to bring new insights to a number of philosophical issues related to perception, 
and on the other, how greater philosophical scrutiny of the phenomenon can in turn benefit 
scientific practice.  
 
5.1 The subject matter of perception 
Minimally, research on material perception makes clear that the subject matter of perception 
includes stuff (Adelson, 2001). However, theories of the individuals picked out by perception are 
generally object focused: what we primarily see are “bodies” that are bounded, cohesive, rigid, 
solid, and have three-dimensional shape (Burge, 2010), or are structured and mereologically 
complex individuals (O’Callaghan, 2016). Moving beyond these views, Green (2019) suggests 
that groups that conform to Gestalt principles are perceived as perceptual objects as we can visually 
track things that violate conditions like cohesion, such as shapes that appear to “pour” from one 
location to another, so long as they move in a tightly clustered unison (Howe et al. 2013; vanMarle 
and Scholl, 2003). Such a conclusion comes naturally from thinking about material perception 
directly, as we can also readily predict and reason about liquid-like materials (Bates et al. 2019), 
even if it is in a manner that is different than for objects. Indeed, if stuff is also a fundamental 
subject matter for vision, then the fact that our ability to track substance-like stimuli that expand 
and contract is diminished in comparison to tracking rigid bodies may simply show that the wrong 
standard is being used to measure perceptual object-hood.  
 
Appreciating materials as a distinct type of perceptual subject matter (a term we prefer to 
“individuals”) also opens new avenues for exploring the contents of material perception. Typically, 
perceptual content is characterized in terms of attribution of a property to a particular, or 
quantified-over entity (Burge, 2010, Davies, 1992). How does this picture map onto materials? 
One issue concerns what property is attributed to what thing. Recall the familiar puzzle of material 
constitution presented by the statue and the clay; when the one object, the statue, is destroyed, the 
other object, the clay, persists. Vision may trade in a similar bifurcation: we see a statue made of 
clay, but we can also a see a portion of clay take the shape of a statue. In such cases, how do we 




Another issue concerns where material properties are attributed. Many optical properties are 
attributed directly to an object’s surface (for opaque materials) or to its whole mass (for transparent 
or translucent materials). Mechanical properties such as viscosity or springiness may have a similar 
“depth”. In the case of material types, however, the localization is less clear. If we look at a block 
of clay, do we see the whole mass as made of the material, or does the attribution end somewhere 
near the surface and the interior remains undifferentiated (Koenderink, 2015)? Vision science may 
benefit from philosophers exploring such questions. 
 
5.2 The ontology of material properties  
Under contemporary usage, “secondary” qualities are those that are mind-dependent, with color 
being the prime example. In light of this, color ontology has become a major topic in its own right 
in the philosophy of perception (Chirimuuta, 2020), and it is not unusual to develop theories of 
color ontology that are then generalized to other, non-visual examples of secondary qualities like 
musical pitch or odors (e.g., Isaac, 2014). Some material properties may be secondary qualities as 
well. For example, how glossy or “shiny” something looks can be dissociated from its reflectance 
properties, just as with color (Figure 10). Thus, while whether something is wooden or stone does 
not seem mind-dependent, gloss, and other material properties, may present as much of a 
“problem” of realism as color (cf. Hilbert and Bryne, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 10. Left two rendered objects that appear identical in surface gloss, but with different 
BRDFs. Right two rendered objects that appear to have different surface gloss that are composed 
of identical material. Reproduced with permission from Vangorp, Laurijssen, and Dutre (2007, 




The same range of theoretical positions about color ontology may be available for gloss. One 
possibility is to endorse gloss eliminativism or revisionary realism (Gert, 2008; Hardin, 1993), or 
alternatively, to treat gloss as relational or response-dependent  as with other secondary qualities 
(Cohen, 2004). According to pragmatic views, the visual system is not structured to represent 
colors as such but rather to treat chromatic properties of surfaces as one of many cues for object 
recognition (Akins and Hahn, 2014; Chirimuuta and Kingdom, 2015). Extending such a position 
to gloss may fit well with the view, described earlier, that rejects the idea of material property 
estimation as inverse optics. Another possibility is that material properties like gloss may not easily 
be characterized as either a primary or secondary quality, and instead straddle the division.  
 
Material perception may also require re-evaluation of theories of secondary qualities more 
generally, and color in particular. Minimally, gloss perception can also modulate color constancy 
(Granzier et al. 2014; Wedge-Roberts et al. 2020), which theories of color ontology may also need 
to take stock of as has been the case for color science (Maloney and Brainard, 2010; cf. Chirimuuta, 
2020). But more provocatively, it is notable that colorfulness is often treated as itself a material 
property that is diagnostic of material type (e.g. Fleming et al. 2013; Baumgartner et al. 2013). 
From such a perspective, color is just one of many optical properties revealed by the interplay 
between illuminations and surfaces.  
 
There are also other material properties we see that do not neatly qualify as optical or mechanical, 
an instead seem emotional or aesthetic in nature. For example, our appreciation of the sculptures 
in Figure 3 clearly involves attributing aesthetic properties based on the materials utilized 
(Schmidt, 2019). One interesting branch of material research has been framed around the Japanese 
concept of Shitsukan (“quality / texture / feel”), which defies neat physical correlates. A piece of 
sushi may have the Shitsukan of being moist, translucent, delicious, cold, and fresh – only some 
of which translate to physical dimensions (Komatsu & Goda, 2018; Spence 2020). Here insights 
may be gained from work at the intersection of philosophy of perception and aesthetic experience 
(Nanay, 2016). 
 
5.3 The perspectival character of material perception 
21 
 
An ever-present feature of visual experience is that we always see things in a particular way. For 
example, there is some sense in which a rotated coin looks similar to an ellipse viewed head-on, 
or a white surface in a shadow appears similar to a grey surface directly illuminated. Such 
experiences may even seem contradictory; that the coin looks both round and elliptical or the 
surface both white and gray. While the example of the coin may point to the underappreciated 
topic of spatial perception (Green and Schellenberg, 2018), the perspectival character of perception 
is highly salient in the case of material perception as well (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11. The perspectival character of material perception. Images (A) and (B) are renderings 
of an identical material – the only difference is that (A) is illuminated by a complex natural 
environment, while (B) is illuminated by a lamp emitting light in only one direction. The glossiness 
of the material is far more apparent in (A), where the complex illumination allows the surface to 
manifest many highlights. In some ways, the image in (B) looks more similar to the matte material 
in (C), which is illuminated by the same natural environment as (A). 
 
Such a case may have consequences for theories of the perspectival character of visual experience. 
One common proposal is to associate this character directly with representations of relational 
properties between observers and their environment, which is contrasted with representations of 
visual attributes such as the actual shape or color of an object (Cohen, 2010; Schellenberg, 2008). 
Alternatively, it may be that it is the structural relationship between these representations of 
relational properties and visual attributes that accounts for such cases (Lande, 2018). At a more 
fundamental level, examples like Figure 11 also show that the perspectival character of material 
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perception is closely tied with how we represent optical properties like gloss (cf. Morales, Bex, 
and Firestone, 2020). 
 
Here again philosophical work remains to be done in terms of what it is we see when we look at 
highlights, which are themselves a reflection of the illuminating scene. If we can literally see 
through mirrors and pictures (for example Yetter-Chappell, 2018), then does the same hold for 
highlights in which the structure of the scene is partially visible? Or in the case of mirrored, 
irregular surfaces, does this require switching between seeing surfaces as mirrors to the scene, or 
as the scene as a reflected texture that contains important diagnostic distortions for resolving 
surface shape (Fleming et al. 2004)? Such questions once more remain to be explored. 
 
5.4 Multimodal material perception 
Although we have focused on vision, material perception is clearly multimodal: we can distinguish 
between paper and plastic not just by sight, but by how it feels to the touch (Baumgartner, Wiebel 
& Gegenfurtner, 2013), or the sound it makes when deformed (Giordano & McAdams, 2006). In 
light of this, material perception relates to a number of philosophical topics concerning multimodal 
perception. 
 
First, the topic of the subject matter of perception is also a multimodal one (Green, 2019; 
O’Callaghan, 2016), and it is worth considering again whether objects provide the appropriate 
theoretical foundation. While it may be obvious the subject matter of touch includes stuff (not just 
objects), it is worth considering whether sounds themselves should be better thought of as acoustic 
substances that flow, form, dissolve, an undulate, and how such a position relates to the influential 
view of sounds as events (O’Callaghan, 2007). Second, touch has in part been difficult to define 
as a sense, in part because of the heterogeneity of what it detects (de Vignemont and Massin, 2015; 
Fulkerson, 2020). But as we have seen, many of these properties, such as texture, hardness, and 
solidity, are available to vision as well, and appreciating this overlap may help in delineating sense 
modalities. Finally, material perception also offers a different perspective on Molyneux’s problem: 
would a formerly blind person, given the ability of sight, readily recognize distinct shapes that they 
previously only perceived from touch? While this question is multifaceted (Matthen & Cohen, 
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2020), the same question can be posed as to whether mechanical properties revealed by touch 
would also be quickly matched with vision.7   
 
5.5 Categorizing materials and the nature of perception 
In our discussion we have characterized recognizing material categories as a perceptual 
phenomenon. Such a position is potentially philosophically controversial in several related 
respects.  
 
First, we have implied that attributing material categories to what we see is a facet of our visual 
experience. However, it is openly debated whether visual experiences are so rich that they include 
representing properties not just of shape or color but also object categories like being a tree (Siegel, 
2006). Thus, it may similarly be debated whether visual experiences represent material categories 
as we have suggested. Second, we have assumed that material categorization is largely proprietary 
to the visual system. This position has been taken to entail that visual categorization involves 
conceptualization, whereas others assert that vision only involves representations with non-
conceptual content (Gauker, 2017; Mandelbaum, 2018). Finally, we have emphasized that material 
categorization can modulate material property estimation (Schmid et al. 2020; Figure 6). Such 
feedback relations have also featured in discussions of whether vision is cognitively penetrated 
(Tuefel and Nanay, 2017), with some questioning whether visual recognition is itself a perceptual 
phenomenon precisely because of its recruitment of memory (Firestone and Scholl, 2016).  
 
Underlying these inter-related topics is the issue of how we differentiate perception from cognition 
(if at all). Does the division depend on the format of the representations they trade in (iconic vs 
abstract) or their information-processing architecture such as informational encapsulation or 
stimulus dependence (Quilty-Dunn, 2020)? Greater attention to material perception may offer 
important case studies for these debates. For example, the material-weight illusion (Seashore, 
1899) could be taken to provide evidence either that material categorization is perceptual, or that 
the estimation of weight—a material property—is cognitively penetrable.   
 
7 Newly sighted individuals are much better at discerning the number of objects in a scene when motion cues are 
present (Ostrovsky et al. 2009). It remains unknown whether such individuals would be able to discern mechanical 





Almost all our visual impressions arise from the interaction between light and materials, only some 
of which form objects. We recognise rich repertoires of material types and perceive subtle 
distinctions in material properties. Both science and philosophy have long focussed on seeing 
things, to the neglect of stuff (Adelson, 2001). Greater attention to material perception may require 
a shift in how we think of what, how, and why we see. 
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